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RIGHT OF A SURETY TO SUBROGATION
AFTER PAYMENT ON A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
BY JOHN E. FOURT
A surety is a promisor in another's behalf. After
a surety pays the amount of the obligation to the cre-
ditor, he becomes subrogated to all the remedies avail-
able to the creditor against the principal debtor. This
right of subrogation should include the right to bring
action against the principal debtor on any securities
held by the creditor evidencing the obligation.
The law of suretyship in California, however,
holds that payment by a surety who is either primarily
or secondarily liable on a negotiable instrument "ex-
tinguishes" the obligation. The paying surety is rele-
gated to his action of assumpsit against his principal
debtor, based on an implied in fact promise of reimburse-
ment. This question of remedies is material since the
California Statute of Limitations on promisory notes is
four years, while the assumpsit statute of limitations
is two years. Further, the note may contain provisions
allowing th'e holder to confess judgment, add costs of
collections, add interest, and waive defenses.
An accommodation indorser-surety who pays the
holder the face amount of the note either before or
after maturity, should be able to bring action on the
note against the maker-principal debtor to recover the
money paid out plus any added costs provided for in
the note.
California, in a long line of decisions follow-
ing Yule vs. Bishop, 6 Cal. Unrep. 513, 62 Pac. 68, 133
Cal. 571, 65 Pac. 1094 (1907), has held contra. In Yule
vs. Bishop, Corporation X executed a promissory note to
C, on which S was an accommodation indorser. C request-
ed S to pay the note after maturity, and S did so, tak-
ing an assignment of the note. S then recovered judg-
ment against the bankrupt maker. The assignee of S then
filed action on the note and the judgment against the
shareholders to enforce a statutory liability. The
California Supreme Court held that payment by S extin-
guished the obligation, and that the statutory lia-
bility of the shareholders could only be enforced by
an action in assumpsit, based on the reimbursement
rights of a surety against the principal debtor. The
court based its decision on Civil Code, Section 1473.
The doctrine of subrogation developed in the Eng-
lish Equity courts, and was early adopted into the
common law. Following the custom of London, payment by
a surety did not discharge a negotiable instrument. The
contrary doctrine was laid down by Lord Elden in Copis
vs. Middleton, 1 Turn & R 220 and by Lord Brougham in
Iodgson vs. Shaw, 3 Mylne & K 183. The California
court found that civil code Section 1473, enacted in
1872, had adopted this later English rule. Parliament
changed the English law on this point in the 1856 Mer-
cantile Law Amendment and provided that payment by a
surety does not discharge a-negotiable instrument.
Civil Code Section 1473 still reads the same in
1949 as in 1907. "Full performance of an obligation,
by the party whose duty it is to Perform it, or by any
other person on his behalf, and with his assent, if
accepted by the creditor, extinguishes it." (Emphasis
added.) Civil Code Section 1474, which was also en-
acted in 1872 provides that "Performance of an obliga-
tion, by one of several persons who are jointly liable
under it, extinguishes the liability of all."*
It is suggested that when an accommodation in-
dorser-surety pays the holder of a negotiable instru-
men-t as a party secondarily liable, after default of
the maker-principal debtor, that the payment extin-
guishes his liability as indorser-surety, but does not
extinguish the primary liability of the maker-princi-
pal debtor. The phrase "whose duty it is to perform
it" should be construed to refer to the principal
debtor as between the maker and accommodation indorser,
instead of to the person secondarily liable on the
note, if the common law rights of a surety as codi-
fied in Civil Code sections 2848 and 2849 are to have
meaning and effect.
Civil Code Section 2848: "A surety, upon satis-
fying the obligation of the principal, is entitled to
enforce every remedy which the creditor then has against
the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has
expended, and also to require all his co-sureties to
contribute thereto, without regard to the order of time
in which they became such." (Emphasis added).
Civil Code Section 2849: "A surety is entitled
to the benefit of every security for the performance of
the principal obligation held by the creditor, or by a
co-surety at the time of entering into the contract of
suretyship, or acquired by him afterwards, whether the
surety was aware of the security or not."
As a rule of construction, the general Civil Code
Section 1473 on extinction of obligations should be
harmonized with the more specific code sections 2848
and 2849 concerning the position of sureties.
It is obvious that if the holder-creditor may
bring action on the note against the maker-principal
debtor, and that the surety after payment may not do
so, that the surety is not entitled to enforce every
remedy available to the creditor as is provided in
Civil Code Section 2848.
Where the majority of American jurisdictions
cite N.I.L. Sections 119(1), 121, and 121(2) in sup-
port of the rule that payment by an accommodation
maker or accommodation indorser does not discharge the
note, California citing the same section's has held
contra. For example see Marston Co. vs. Fisheries
Co., 201 Cal. 715, 258 Pac. 933 (1927), where the
California Supreme Court cited N.I.L. Sections 120
and 121 (Civil. Code Sections 3201 and 3202) without
discussion as "not changing the California rule."
Texas, in Fox vs. Kroeger, 119 Texas 511, 35 S.W. 2d
679 (1931) allowed the accommodation indorser-surety
to be subrogated to the rights of the holder-credi-
tor in filing action on the note against the maker-
principal debtor. This court construed the N.I.L.
Sections 119(1), 121, and 121(2) as a group
N.I.L. 119(1) provides "A negotiable instru-
ment is discharged by payment in due course by or
on behalf of the principal debtor." Section 121
provides "Where the instrument is paid by a party
secondarily liable th-ereon, it is not discharged,
but the party so paying it is remitted to his for-
mer rights as regards all prior parties, and he may
strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements,
and again negotiate the instrument, except" N.I.L.
121(2) "where it was made or excepted for accommo-
dation, and Has been paid by the party accommodated."
The Texas court found that payment by a party
secondarily liable does not discharge the instrument by
express provision of NII.L. Section 121. This Texas
Court construed N.I.L. Section 121(2) to mean that pay-
ment by the accommodated party discharges the instrumen-t,
but that payment by the accommodating drawer or accomo-
dating indorser does not discharge the instrument.
Another analagous line of cases in California have
held that payment by an accommodation maker either be-
fore or after maturity of the note extinguishes the
obligation, citing Civil Code Section 1473. The Calif-
ornia Supreme Court squarely so decided in James vs.
Yeager, 86 Cal. 186, 24 Pac. 1005 (1890). It is sub-
mitted that the weight of authority has the better view
in holding contra. In Pease vs. Syler, 78 Wash. 24,
138 Pac. 310 (1914), the Washington Supreme Court held
that the accommodation maker-surety could bring action
on the note against his co-maker principal debtor, after
paying the holder at maturity. The Washington Supreme
Court-distinguished the California cases as based on a
peculiar statute, and cited the Negotiable Instruments
Law Section's 120 and 121(2) as sustaining its position.
It is submitted that the majority rule prevailing
outside California in both the American and British
courts will best meet the needs of the business com-
munity. Both nations have credit economies and laws
which will aid the securing of credit risks will be in
social favor. Creditors often require borrowers to
produce persons as indemnitors on the proposed loan.
A person will more likely go surety for a needful bor-
rower if his remedies against the borrower are the
equal of the creditor.
Technical arguments buttressing this social pol-
icy include the harmonizing of the California Civil
Code Sections on extinguishment of obligations with
the sections concerning the rights of sureties. The
construction given to sections 119(1), 121 and 121(2)
by the majority of the" American jurisdictions, if
adopted in California, would change the present law.
Britton: Bills and Arotes, 1943, at Page 1120, cites
the jurisdictions which are contra to the California
rule. Bigelow: Bills, Motes and Checks, Section 570
and 571, and Brannon: Negotiable Instruments Law,
Sections 119 and 120, ar-e in accord.

